I. Introduction 

I began researching energy independence in Haiti after watching anti-austerity International Monetary Fund (IMF) riots over fluctuating fuel prices.1Initially I was thinking of prescribing decentralized solar production as a means of building infrastructure and individual equity. I looked into other methods of achieving energy independence, with an aim to optimize outcomes through maximizing mixed policy approaches. I quickly discovered that any environmental analysis of this tiny island nation would be incomplete if it did not demonstrate how the energy crisis is inseparable from food security, land tenure, revenue generation, and institutional legitimacy. The environmental crisis in Haiti represents a wicked, complex challenge.2It stands at the intersection of a host of problems, where weakened governance compounds with an eroding agrarian self-determination. 

Haiti stands at an interesting point on the spectrum between agrarian and market economies. Policies that work for the capital Port-au-Prince are unlikely to be effective or relevant to the rest of the country. Haiti’s limited urban property regime may benefit from policies that favor solar production. However, the majority—rural subsistence communities— rely on woodfuel to satisfy over 70% of their energy needs.3 This woodfuel reliance mixes with unstable tenure rights to incentivize inappropriate farming practices that lead to erosion, deforestation and diaspora.4 Additionally, the emergent transaction costs associated with growing socio-economic inequity and incomplete ecological valuations grind the soil and the poor into dissolution. Over half the population is unemployed in the market economy. Subsistence farming and foraging provides enough for most Haitians to have one meal a day.5 Basic food commodity prices may fluctuate as much as 40% in a given year.6 This all coalesces to incentivize poor land management practices aimed exclusively at necessary short-term agricultural gains. 

Previous energy policy prescriptions have focused on optimal interfuel substitutions within dependency systems rather than capacity-building toward self-sufficiency.7 This approach has largely ignored the limited purchasing power of the people and the country. Although international finance and aid have consistently flowed into Haiti, the GDP has been declining since 1980 CE, with tax revenues accounting for only 1.8% of the GDP in 2005.8 Lack of revenue led to diminished administrative institutions, which could not guarantee stability or the rule of law outside the center. Additionally, growing soil degradation caused Haiti to spend precious import revenue on foreign food stuffs, rather than spending on capacity-building imports or sustaining institutions. Lack of infrastructural progress and repeated institutional collapse has eroded public confidence in Haiti’s governing bodies. 

The social and sedimentary soil of Haiti has been depleted by the colonizing machinations of history and a globalizing economy. The challenge for environmental governance in Haiti is in sustainably establishing the foundational public goods which are necessary to build socio-economic capacity and public trust of institutions. These public goods are prerequisite for any state hoping to advance environmental protections.9 As wicked as the environmental challenges in Haiti are, the opportunities in Haiti are more dynamic still. Haiti’s informal and formal institutions are poised to build on existing successes, and a new aeon is breaking in. Environmental cadres legitimized by measured performance outputs will bolster Haitian confidence in the capacity of institutions to deliver social change and respond to popular feedback. A state-run agroforestry enterprise will allow Haiti to build sustainable institutional legitimacy while addressing crucial environmental issues and propagating land tenure rights. A property rights regime centered on regenerative land management practices will promote social stability, enfranchisement, and self-determination. Achieving food and energy sovereignty will break the chains that bind Haiti, liberating them from dependence on the conditional lending schemes of interested, unaccountable international finance institutions. 

Contextualizing the Problems

(non)Native Substrate: Roots Above, Branches Below11 

While Hispaniola had a rich history prior to colonizing influence, France established Haiti in the early 1700s after several conflicts with co-occupying Spain.12 Haiti was predominantly known for its sugar plantations, which were worked by Africans incarcerated by the Atlantic slave trade. After over ten years of rebellion, Toussaint L’Ouverture—a former slave and the first black French general—led the enslaved people of Haiti in a liberating revolution, casting out the very army that trained him. However, Haiti’s history since winning independence in 1804 CE has been anything but peaceable. 

Haiti has suffered over thirty coups, and drafted over twenty national Constitutions during its two-hundred year history. Many (if not most) of these conflicts were generated by external politico-economic influence or direct imperial occupation. More recently, the United States have tried to overthrow the Haitian government twice since 1990 CE.13 Haiti’s political destiny has also been entangled with international aid and finance from the United States and the IMF, among other actors on the international stage. 

The IMF, tasked with helping countries “build and maintain strong economies,”14 often mitigates domestic policy failures instead. This has the effect of reducing global welfare if conditional lending leads to a net reduction in sustainable capacity development and crisis prevention efforts.15 The World Bank has repeatedly suggested the same approach: restore the capacity of democratic state institutions made in the image of American and European nations.16 Lack of localized ownership and capacity for policy initiatives has led to an ebb and flow of institutional legitimacy, with infrastructure and initiative rising and falling with the tides of international finance. This trend has eroded public confidence in government efforts and given rise to deep-seated institutional mistrust.17 Conditional lending in response to Haiti’s various crises has thus proven disruptive rather than productive, because Haiti cannot renegotiate conditional lending terms.18 Rather than acting as a communication channel between the Haitian people and the global economy, the Haitian government has been bound to acting as functionaries in externally-contrived development schemes with little to no democratic input mechanisms. 

Forest Floor: Implicitly Cultivating Topsoil Erosion and Diaspora 

       At the ground level, Haiti’s surpluses are perpetually flowing out of the system. For much of its political history, the land was able to subsidize insolvent socio-ecological systems. However, over-population pressures and inappropriate land management practices stemming from lack of land tenure have led to deforestation and erosion. While Haiti was once covered with mature tropical forest canopies, today only about 1.25% of that mature canopy coverage remains.19 While ongoing internal displacement played a major role, state initiatives have also devastated the forests with projects promising a great leap forward in infrastructure, but delivering erosion, corruption and plunder.20 Commercial and subsistence clear-cutting have produced significant erosion21 and topsoil depletion.22 This has caused flooding, and exacerbated problems associated with native soil toxicity and other pollution.23 

This instability and corruption has produced a history of displacement within Haiti. A dearth of economic, academic, and political opportunities has created incentives for movement from Haiti as well. The Haitian socio-ecological system has been hemorrhaging wealthy, educated citizenry for some time. This problem of (voluntary(?)) diaspora is so widespread and so well-known that Haitians refer to these expatriates as “the 11th Department.”24 Because the intellectual, agricultural, fertility, and financial surpluses are consistently flowing out of the system, Haiti has not been able to build its productive capacity. 

Understory: Observable Agrarian Expertise and Social Resilience 

Though the wicked challenges facing Haiti are many and varied, the dynamic resilience historically engendered by the Haitian people demonstrates that the opportunities for righteous solutions are greater still. Haiti has a host of assets in its informal and formal institutions whose existing momentum can facilitate movement on the trajectory toward environmental sustainability. Capturing this momentum and maximizing existing assets is key to crafting cognizable solutions. Positive change begins when novel mobilizing movements feel familiar to the bodies of citizens and institutions. 

Involving Haitian citizenry not only satisfies democratic notions, but maximizes a major indigenous asset: agrarian expertise.25 Peasant farmers have historically possessed many of the knowledge- and skill-sets needed to create sustainable agricultural systems, but Haitian farmers have faced social and tenure conditions incompatible with sustainable practices. NGO initiatives like the Peasant Movement of Papaye have successful histories of working with Haitian farmers to hone agrarian expertise.26 Quasi-governmental initiatives like the Agroforestry Outreach Project, affectionately referred to as Pwojè Pyebwa (Tree Project), have succeeded in engaging farmers by replanting millions of trees in Haiti.27 Over 80% of Haitians practice Voduo, which celebrates the centrality of tree culture in many of its rituals. These several informal institutions represent some of Haiti’s invaluable assets in striving toward socio-ecological solvency. 

Additionally, the nation created some relevant legal foundations in its Constitution of 1987 CE which are important in a conversation about conservation and regeneration. First, the Haitian Constitution guarantees economic freedom “so long as it is not contrary to the public interest.”28 Second, the Constitution enables state-run enterprises, and even provides a commandeering mechanism for critical private enterprises threatened with collapse.29 These enterprises are to be grouped in comprehensive management systems. Third, the Constitution promotes the formation of cooperatives for production and processing of raw materials.30 

Finally and perhaps most pertinent, the Constitution provides for establishment of The National Institute of Agrarian Reform, a special agency whose task is “to organize the revision of real property structures and to implement an agrarian reform to benefit those who actually work the land. This institute shall draw up an agrarian policy geared to optimizing productivity by constructing infrastructure aimed at the protection and management of the land.”31 This network of informal and formal institutions will provide fertile social soil in which Haiti can grow, beyond sustainability toward regenerative (and surplus-retaining) socio-ecological systems. 

Growing Solutions 

Haiti might benefit greatly from adopting governance models other than European style democracy. When Haiti first governed itself, it choose imperial and monarchical models. Since adopting democratic institutions, Haiti’s presidential elections have been filled with near-messianic expectations. Impossible expectations and unfulfilled promises have eroded confidence in the government over time. With more recent declining GDP trends curtailing existing institutional capacity, apathy and unconstructive revolting has further diminished Haiti’s already depleted sources of political will and action. This tumultuous history stands in stark contrast to China, who harnessed permanent revolution32to convert the energy of collapsing transitory institutions into permanent regime resilience.33 

While Haiti may benefit more broadly from adopting China’s party-cadre system of governance,34this question is set aside for another time. Though Haiti may not adopt China’s party system wholesale, it can certainly take lessons from China’s political history. China found a way to utilize environmental action in addressing political friction.35 Like Haiti, China did not need to revise its adequate legal frameworks for environmental governance. Rather, China is using cadre evaluation to drive environmental efficiency gains,36 achieving “legitimacy through performance, or delivery of outputs.”37 

Cadre evaluation is a way to maximize the planning strengths of the center while also maximizing the administrative and implementation strengths of the local. “Cadre evaluation is analogous to military command with mission priorities set by top leadership and tactics left to lower-level actors.”38 Unlike recent trends in American politics wherein the public is bunched with terrorists under labels like “environmental extremists,”39 the Chinese have come to see the public as an ally in environmental regulation.40 This shift demonstrates the cadre’s capacity to respond to popular feedback. Cadre evaluation goes further in the movement to harmonize private and social goals by utilizing the perverse incentives that lead to corruption. By providing legitimate avenues for administrative careers to grow, the entrepreneurial spirit of government officials is appropriately rewarded in a way consistent with the needs of the system. 

Haiti should respond to its several intersecting crises by synthesizing the Haitian legal framework for environmental protection with the Chinese environmental cadre system. What follows is one vision for what this synthesis might look like. 

Canopy Layer: Cadres, Agroforestry, and the Propagation of Tenure 

       Piti, piti, wazo fe nich li—little by little, the bird builds its nest. Haiti’s agricultural sector is plagued by a history of inappropriate land use.41 Standing at the intersection of environmental, social, economic, and political crises, Haiti’s National Institute of Agrarian Reform (NIAR) should address these tensions by establishing state agroforestry enterprises in each of the forty-two arrondissements. These enterprises are placed in strategically located tracts within each arrondissement, striking an optimal balance between: 

These enterprises would serve not only to generate revenue for the government, but also act as regenerative models of biointensive production for tree crops. This would include growing fruits, nuts, timber, animal products, and fuel where appropriate. The energy needs of the majority can be satisfied by growing short-rotation coppice42 materials for fuel, providing necessary biomass while ensuring minimal soil disturbance. 

Agroforestry enterprises would act as training grounds for licensure in an emerging land grant regime. Designing the models with this function in mind represents a commitment to include essential local communities in environmental action.43 The enterprise will assist local farmers to hone skill-sets and expertise, allowing knowledge from the center and from those below to converge. Enterprise training, analogous to a permaculture design certificate, is prerequisite to receiving a land grant. 

Once a grant is allocated, the enterprise works with the grantee to develop suitable site designs. This maximizes the benefits of centralized planning and overcomes some of the challenges presented by 60% literacy rates. Utilizing GIS data and soil-crop compatibility modeling maximizes agricultural productivity and minimize externalities,44 while eliminating ecologically and economically inappropriate land usage. It allows local farmers to benefit from the knowledge of the center, and work with the environment rather than against it. Enterprise reporting mechanisms or ongoing trainings capture new knowledge and techniques discovered and created by local farmers, generating a system wherein information flows freely in each direction. 

The enterprises serve as distribution hubs, permitting collective cost saving, localized processing for the retention of precious biomass, collective bargaining, continuing education, and administrative support. From a regulatory perspective, surveillance costs are minimized by strategic concentration of land grants. GIS data utilization in the planning processes prevents ill-suited uses, while minimizing socio-political externalities (e.g. continued environmental degradation, heavy metal consumption from food stuffs). As the enterprise canopy grows it generates opportunities for administrative careers, which builds social capacity for the retention of Haitian intellectuals and professionals who would otherwise join the diaspora. 

Without certain degrees of stability and predictability, market systems cannot thrive.45 At an ambient level, the agroforestry enterprises propagate a property rights regime centered on regenerative land management practices. This cultivates social stability and promotes enfranchisement by ensuring property rights and a market in which it can thrive.46 The enterprises harness the power of the local, enticing the market to pull in the direction of environmental gain. These environmental gains contribute to food independence, social stability, national security, increased exports, and increased import capacity (potentially leading to environmental gains in other sectors, such as solar energy). All of this works toward building a sustainable governance legitimacy in Haiti, where institutions are justified by their works and not by faith alone. 

Emergent Property: Speaking Symmetry to Power 

    At the international level above, the IMF is plagued by the age-old problem of inappropriate representation schemes constructing decision-making bodies.47 The Executive Board, which has been historically beholden to the G-7, directs the policy initiatives of the IMF.48 One illustration of this problem: an 85% majority vote is required to elect new Executive Directors, but the United States controls 17% of the votes, making any change impossible without the United States buying in.49 That means less than 5% of the world population can confound the efforts of an institution tasked with asset redistribution for the mutual benefit of all parties at the table (that is, the whole world). The 138 developing nations receive only 19% of the votes in the IMF. This results in inherently anti-democratic voting systems, favoring the hyper-wealthy capable of providing surplus over popular need.50 

In order to avoid repeating the costly political mistakes displayed in Haiti’s history with the IMF, a new steering committee is needed.51 According to the IMF’s own studies, conditionality is only useful when programs are owned by the borrower.52 Only in self-sufficiency; only when Haiti is capable of sustainably providing the pure public goods upon which a stable society depends;53 only when Haiti can feasibly walk away from inappropriate lending conditions will Haiti be able to “own” the policy initiatives and efforts which the IMF and World Bank seeks to extract. The closer Haiti gets to food- and energy-independence, the more likely Haiti will be able to enter negotiations for lending conditions consistent with local trends and popular desires. Without this baseline provision, international finance will continue to be coercive; MDBs will continue to devastate Haitian political equilibrium; policy proposals will continue to work with incomplete valuations; and the environment will be forced to subsidize insolvent socio-ecological systems. The environment’s reserves are dangerously low; I wonder if it’s now or never. 

Conclusions Lingering Questions 

Is it appropriate to conceive of political will as a renewable resource? If so, will “privatizing ownership” of the asset via China’s party-cadre systems lead to sustainable harvesting? Can a tenacious cult of personality represent stability in a society plagued by unending disruption? Is it possible to hybridize democracy with a party-cadre system? Can non-democratic institutions accommodate democratic demands? Do democratic feedback mechanisms in party systems minimize the social transaction cost of policy, or placate the masses? Can we find an efficient allocation of centralized planning that maximizes the strengths of the center as well as those below? Wouldn’t depersonalized and democratically formulated political platforms, administered by apolitical institutions legitimized by outputs, be more appropriate for nations “of laws and not of men”? These wicked questions cannot be answered, only lived and perpetually reformulated by a people responding positively to feedback and change. 

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1 “A New Era of IMF Riots: Protests Force Haiti to Rescind Fuel Hikes,” Amy Goodman and Mark Weisbrot. Democracy Now! July 11, 2018. https://www.democracynow.org/2018/7/11/a_new_era_of_imf_riots (last visited 8/1/18). 

2 “A wicked problem has innumerable causes, is tough to describe, and doesn’t have a right answer... Environmental degradation, terrorism, and poverty—these are classic examples of wicked problems. They’re the opposite of hard but ordinary problems, which people can solve in a finite time period by applying standard techniques. Not only do conventional processes fail to tackle wicked problems, but they may exacerbate situations by generating undesirable consequences.” 

https://hbr.org/2008/05/strategy-as-a-wicked-problem (last visited 8/18/18). 

3 Woodfuel provides 75.8% of Haiti’s energy needs. Hans Tippenhauer, Freedom is Not Enough: Haiti’s Sustainability in Peril, 15 Local Environment 502 (2010). 

4 “Throughout much of the tropics, forestland converted to agricultural and livestock uses loses its productivity extremely quickly (in one to three years). These environmental constraints can be ascertained during project planning; their impact during implementation of a project is readily seen in high rates of emigration from the area and low economic returns from ranching endeavors.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). Pp. 8-9 

5 Clare Ribando. Seelke & J. F. Hornbeck, Haiti: Legislative Responses to the Food Crisis and Related Development Challenges. p. 2 (2008). 

6Ibid. 

7 Richard H. Hosier & Mark A. Bernstein, Woodfuel Use and Sustainable Development in Haiti, 13 The Energy Journal (1992). 8 Willy Egset & Stephanie Kuttner, Governance and Institutions, in Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti 46 (2007). 9 See Table 1. 

10 Coloring book graphic illustrating the fixed metaphor used in title headings below: 

http://x665.info/amazon-canopy-layer-coloring-pages/amazon-canopy-layer-coloring-pages-layers-of-the-rainforest-animals-plants-in the-rainforest-5-4-free/ 

11 Heading inspired by The Devil Wears Prada’s album title, With Roots Above and Branches Below 

12 The French initially called the western portion of the island Saint-Domingue, whereas the indigenous Taino people originally referred to the whole of Hispaniola as Haiti. The revolution in 1804 CE resulted in the Haitian people returning to the former nomenclature. 

13 “A New Era of IMF Riots: Protests Force Haiti to Rescind Fuel Hikes,” Amy Goodman and Mark Weisbrot. Democracy Now! July 11, 2018. https://www.democracynow.org/2018/7/11/a_new_era_of_imf_riots (last visited 8/1/18). 

14 “The IMF promotes international monetary cooperation and provides policy advice and capacity development support to help countries build and maintain strong economies.” The IMF and the World Bank, 

https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/07/27/15/31/IMF-World-Bank (last visited Aug 2, 2018). 15 Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al, Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality 10 (2008). 16 Willy Egset & Stephanie Kuttner, Governance and Institutions, in Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti (2007). 

17 “The Haitian people would rapidly understand that they could not rely on anyone but themselves and that no system, social, political, economic or governmental, could be trusted to work in their best interest.” Hans Tippenhauer, Freedom is Not Enough: Haiti’s Sustainability in Peril, 15 Local Environment 494 (2010). 

18 “Conditionality may be defined as… a tool by which a country is made to adopt specific policies or to undertake certain reforms that it would not have undertaken, in exchange for support… At the heart of conditionality lies a process of negotiation; the Fund offers its financial support in exchange for a government’s commitment to effect particular changes in a member country’s policies… the greater the asymmetry in power between the country and the Fund, and the greater the country’s need, the more likely it will need to accept fully Fund-prescribed conditionality.” Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, in Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives 58–59 (2003). 

19 Hans Tippenhauer, Freedom is Not Enough: Haiti’s Sustainability in Peril, 15 Local Environment 502 (2010). 20 “Haiti has a long history of public office being used to secure private gain… Haiti ranked 155 among the 158 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perception Index.” Willy Egset & Stephanie Kuttner, Governance and Institutions, in Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti 47 (2007). 

21 “In a healthy system, according to [leading Haitian agronomist Chavannes] Jean-Baptiste, erosion can be expected to result in one metric ton of soil loss per hectare per year. Current estimates put soil loss in Haiti at 1,600 metric tons per hectare per year. In a situation that extreme, erosion ceases to be merely an agricultural or environmental issue and becomes an acute humanitarian problem as well: since 2004, flooding cause in part by erosion and deforestation has killed or displaced several thousand Haitians.” Tommy Ventre, Planting Hope on Hispaniola, 21 World Watch p. 10. 

22 “Environmental degradation exacts a price in any country, but the price is most apparent in developing nations, where it directly reduces the supply of food and fuel for the rural poor. Prospects for sustainable agriculture in the Third World are especially constrained by soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and salinization. For example, 40 percent of the productive capacity of Guatemala’s land has been lost to erosion; in Haiti, the loss has been so great that no top-quality soil remains.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). P. 8 23 Along with erosion and industrial pollution, Haiti must overcome the additional challenge of cadmium deposits in the soil. Soil fertility and GIS raster models for tropical agroforestry planning in economically depressed and contaminated Caribbean areas (cof ee and kidney bean plantations), 79 Agroforestry Systems 381–391 (2009). P. 381 

24 Haiti is politically subdivided into ten Departments, which are further divided into forty-two arrondissements. 25 “Local farmers are often the best resource for sustainable techniques suited to the local conditions. Agroforestry, for example, is not a new technology; it is often a traditional practice that farmers have abandoned because of inappropriate systems of forests or land tenure… In regions unsuited to the transfer of high-technology agriculture, development agencies must foster a ‘local knowledge’ revolution in lieu of a green revolution.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35, 29 (1989). 

26 “‘You cannot save the environment without the formal engagement of peasant organizations,’ Jean-Baptiste argues. ‘They must be the principal actors… The problems one encounters working on environmental protection in Haiti are diverse, but in my opinion the biggest problem is one of education and information.’ The new awareness is a first step toward a resolution of the problems, but ultimately what’s need is a national strategy…” Tommy Ventre, Planting Hope on Hispaniola, 21 World Watch p. 10. 27 Over 100,000 Haitian farmers successfully planted over twelve million trees between 1980 and 2000. This project was funded by USAID, and cost around $8-million. Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). P. 34 

28 “Economic freedom shall be guaranteed so long as it is not contrary to the public interest.” Haiti’s Constitution of 1987, article 245. 29 “The State may take charge of the operation of enterprises for the production of goods and services essential to the community in order to ensure continuity in the event the existence of these establishments should be threatened. Such enterprises shall be grouped in a comprehensive management system.” Haiti’s Constitution of 1987, article 252. 

30 “The State encourages in rural and urban areas the formation of cooperatives for production, processing of raw materials and the entrepreneurial spirit to promote the accumulation of national capital to ensure continuous development.” Haiti’s Constitution of 1987, article 246. 

31 Haiti’s Constitution of 1987, article 248. 

32 “Unlike the Soviet Union and its East European satellites, Mao’s China exhibited a trademark policy style that favored continual experimentation and transformation (or ‘permanent revolution’) over regime consolidation… the Chinese polity has proven singularly adept at adjusting to the demands of domestic economic reform and global market competition. A major reason for this glaring difference is China’s unusual receptivity to on-the-ground generation of new knowledge and practice…” Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China, Mao’s Invisible Hand 1–29. p. 10. 

33 “...[T]he Chinese regime’s surprising resilience can be attributed to its institutionalization of the elite succession process and containment of factionalism as well as its success in fostering a ‘high level of acceptance’ through various ‘input institutions’ — local elections, letters-and-visits departments, people’s congresses, administrative litigation, mass media and the like.” Id. at 7. 34 Would a centralized party system harness the momentum of Haiti’s existing personalized political trends? 35 “Environmental cadre evaluation is better understood as part of a broader political strategy to limit risks to the party-state’s hold on power.” Alex L Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 Harvard Environmental Law Review 370 (2013). 

36 “...[R]ather than reform China’s legal system, leaders have relied primarily on top-down party-state bureaucratic mandates to drive performance of new environmental goals.” Id. at 371. 

37 Id. at 375. 

38 Id. at 379. 

39 United States Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke’s descriptor for prominent environmental groups during a radio interview with Breitbart News. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/zinke-says-environmental-terrorist-groups-enabled-wildfires-n901481 (last visited 8/22/18). 

40 “Central Chinese environmental regulators tend to view the public as an ally with aligned interests, and so public accountability can serve to improve central-local accountability as well.” Alex L Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 Harvard Environmental Law Review 435 (2013). 

41 “The results of applying this GIS tool to [Hispaniola], based on the integration of fertility, limiting soil factors and other variables intrinsic to the land, and several excluding factors intrinsic to the planning process, showed that 8.11% of the land is suitable for cultivating beans (13,127 ha) and 2.15% for coffee (3,484 ha). Forestry use should therefore be favoured in this territory.” Stervins Alexis et al., Soil fertility and GIS raster models for tropical agroforestry planning in economically depressed and contaminated Caribbean areas (cof ee and kidney bean plantations), 79 Agroforestry Systems 381–391 (2009). P. 388

42 Coppicing is a method of harvesting where farmers periodically cut back trees or shrubs without destroying them, to generate growth and provide firewood or timber. 

43 “[I]n agroforestry… community-based participation is a prerequisite for success, micro-scale administration of projects is critical.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). P. 34 

44 One such GIS raster model included topographical indices such as precipitation, temperature, slope, and altitude; as well as soil fertility indices including phosphorus, nitrogen, potassium, calcium, iron, zinc, and more. Soil fertility and GIS raster models for tropical agroforestry planning in economically depressed and contaminated Caribbean areas (cof ee and kidney bean plantations), 79 Agroforestry Systems 381–391 (2009). P. 386 

45 “In the absence of predictable systems, there can be no recipe for sustainable success.” Hans Tippenhauer, Freedom is Not Enough: Haiti’s Sustainability in Peril, 15 Local Environment 497 (2010). 

46 “Whether formal or informal, institutions are designed to contain uncertainty and stabilize actors’ expectations about future interactions by specifying certain norms and rules.” Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China, Mao’s Invisible Hand 1–29. p. 31. 

47 “Successful development requires recognition by [Multilateral Development Banks], bilateral aid agencies, and national governments that their paternalistic approach to development is often counterproductive. Planners have long ignored the importance of including the people most affected by a project—local residents—and knowledgeable nongovernmental organizations in the planning process.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). P. 32 

48 “IMF policy on major issues has always been directed by an outside group: the Group of Seven (G-7) since the late 1980s… A fundamental reason for the increasing ineffectiveness of the IMF during the past decade or so has been the ineffectiveness of the steering committee, the G-7.” C. Fred Bergsten, A new Steering Committee for the World Economy?, in Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century 280. 

49 “The twenty-four traditional industrial countries, which never again are likely to need to borrow from the IMF, currently hold 60.3% of the votes in the institution...and 138 other developing countries with 19.3% of the votes…” Edwin M Truman, An IMF Reform Package, in Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century 528. 

50 “All member countries participate in decisions regarding [Multilateral Development Banks] loans, but voting power is weighed by each country’s financial contribution to the bank.” Walter V. C. Reid, Sustainable Development: Lessons from Success, 31 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 7–35 (1989). P. 31 

51 “Reform in the governance structure of the world economy, including in the IMF itself and in the systemic steering committee, is a necessary step toward improving the prospect for effective leadership and thus better global economic performance in the future.” C. Fred Bergsten, A New Steering Committee for the World Economy?, in Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century 291. 52 “Experience and the Fund’s own studies show that program success is closely related to local ownership, and that ownership cannot be externally imposed...Since conditionality cannot compensate for the lack of program ownership, it can only be helpful to the extent that it fits with the member’s goals.” Ariel Buira, An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, in Challenges to the World Bank and IMF: Developing Country Perspectives 80 (2003). 

53 See Table 1.